I have a new article that was just published today in the March issue of the CTC Sentinel,
a journal published by the Combating Terrorism Center, an academic unit
housed at West Point. The article examines notable shifts in both the
military and media/information operations strategies of the Somali
Islamist insurgent movement Al-Shabab (Harakat al-Shabab
al-Mujahideen). I look at, for example, the movement's self-portrayal
of its "insurgent governance," its shift back to (re)becoming a
primarily underground guerilla force, and the impact of defections on
its ability to wage its insurgency.
central and southern Somalia south of the autonomous region of Puntland.
Since the February 2011 military offensives by the African Union
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), Somali government troops, and Somali Sufi
militia forces, al-Shabab has suffered a series of significant
territorial and strategic setbacks. Pressures on the insurgent
movement increased when Kenya and Ethiopia, together with client Somali
militias, invaded its southern and western strongholds in October and
November 2011. The Kenyan military’s goal from the onset of its campaign
inside Somalia was to seize the vital port city of Kismayo, one of
al-Shabab’s most important economic centers. Kenya seized control of
that city in October 2012. Ethiopian troops and their Somali allies
quickly captured the Ethiopia-Somalia border town of Beledweyne, and
within two months had also captured the city of Baidoa in western
This article assesses the trajectory of both al-Shabab’s military and
political strategies, explains how defections have weakened the group,
and reviews its information and media operations during the past two
years in the midst of its relatively rapid territorial losses."
Read the rest HERE.